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STATE TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
AND DEATH BENEFITS
IILLIAM H. SAGER*
JAY M3. WEINBERG*
INTRODUCTION
ACCENTUATED by the depression of the 1930's which dramatized
the economic insecurity of society, we have witnessed in the past
twenty-five years a tremendous growth in the search for economic security
for the individual. The opportunity for a person to protect himself and
his family against economic hazards is essential to the welfare, freedom
and dignity of the American citizen. Specifically, these economic hazards
take the form of three contingencies: (1) The loss of livelihood because
of the death or disability of the family's principal provider; (2) The
hazards of illness, accident or loss of employment; and (3) The lack of
adequate income for the overaged employee and his dependents.
Economic security for the individual may be viewed as an attempt to
insure a continuity of income, which can be translated into purchasing
power for the benefit of the individual and his dependents. Such financial
stability may be created in several different ways and at any of the
levels of our government. Its most prevalent form today is social insur-
ance in the form of social security and workmen's compensation laws.
However, another type of payment created by government exists in the
case of definite services rendered to it by an individual, e.g., military
retirement, civil service retirement and pensions.
Continuity of income may also be created by the individual, himself,
or by his employer. The former may make it available through prior
savings, or investments in life insurance, annuities, stocks, bonds, or
real estate. The latter has usually resorted to private insurance or retire-
ment trust plans. Favorable federal income tax treatment accorded to
certain types of pension and profit sharing plans, which meet the specifi-
cations of the Internal Revenue Code, has provided these retirement
programs a healthy atmosphere in which to grow.'
The constant development and expansion of such retirement plans has
necessarily engendered a new interest in the state taxation of their
benefits.' The continuity of income received by the overaged worker,
M embers of Virginia Bar.
1. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b)(2)(B).
2. At the end of the first quarter of 1960, there vere an estimated 58,0OtC pensions and
profit sharing plans in effect. Of these, 60% were pension plans, and the remainder were
profit sharing plans. In addition, there were an estimated 8,000 cash and deferred profit
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the injured worker, the retired individual or the beneficiaries of a de-
cedent may, or may not, give rise to a taxable event for state tax purposes.
Determination of the state tax liability, if any, requires careful consider-
ation and analysis. The purpose of this article is to determine the status
of retirement and death benefits and their liability under state tax
statutes. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the various types of
payments in relation to income, inheritance or gift taxation.
PART ONE: STATE INHERITANCE TAXATION OF DEATH
BENEFITS
Pension, profit sharing and retirement plans sponsored by commercial
or industrial enterprises take a wide variety of forms. Some of the fac-
tors which influence the form of plan include the size of the particular
company, in both resources and number of employees, its experience
with employee turnover, the approach it desires to use in its plan, the
scope of the plan, the nature of the benefits, the question of funded
versus unfunded and trusteed versus nontrusteed plans, and a variety
of other considerations. The principal objective of the plan, however,
is to benefit the employee at his retirement or his dependents at his death.
Death benefits payable under pension and profit sharing plans, and
sharing plans in existence. McMahon, Gains Recorded in Profit Sharing, N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1960, § 3 (Financial), p. 27, col. 2. At the end of the calendar year 1958, there
were an estimated nineteen million employees covered by private pension and deferred profit
sharing plans. This represented an increase of about ten million over the number of em-
ployees covered in 1950. More than three-fourths of the employees were covered by private
plans. These were noninsured plans, such as "trusteed" funds, multi-employer plans, union
plans with no employer participation, "pay-as-you-go" plans, plans of nonprofit organizations,
and deferred profit sharing plans. The remaining one-fourth of the employees were covered
under insured plans underwritten by private insurance companies. Since 1950, employee
coverage under noninsured programs has more than doubled, and coverage under insured
plans has increased by about three-fourths. The amount contributed in 1958 to finance private
retirement plans was almost $4.7 billion of which it is estimated that employers contributed
about 851. This rate of contribution has remained about the same during the period 1950-
1958. There were estimated to be 1,410,000 beneficiaries receiving periodic payments, totaling
$13 billion from private pension funds at the end of 1958. The benefits paid under non-
insured plans included: (1) refunds of employee contributions made to individuals who
withdrew from the plan before retirement or before accumulating vested rights; (2) pay-
ments to survivors of pensioners who died before they received retirement benefits equal to
the amount of their contributions; and (3) lump sum payments made under deferred
profit sharing plans. Skolnick, Employee-Benefit Plans, 1954-58, Social Security Bull.
vol. 23, No. 3, p. 3 (1960). For an earlier report see Skolnick & Zisman, Growth In
Employee-Benefit Plans, 1954-57, Social Security Bull. vol. 22, No. 3, p. 4 (1959). During
1958, trusteed corporate pension fund totals reached a high of $22.1 billion in book value,
thus exceeding for the first time the reserves of $21.9 billion at book value of the Govern-
ment's Old Age and Survivors Insurance Fund. 98 Trusts & Estates 561 (1959).
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other employee retirement benefits may, or may not, be includible in
the deceased employee's gross estate for state inheritance tax purposes.
The application of state inheritance taxation to death benefits payable
under such plans arises under the general statutory provisions designed
to tax a transfer of property intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death.5
Prior to 1948, it was difficult to find a state tax decision involving
inheritance taxation of death or employee retirement benefits. During
the 1950's, however, there were ten such cases decided by the highest
courts in nine states.4 Already in this decade there have been three such
decisions from the highest courts in as many states.5 There has also been
a large number of opinions from local courts of record, such as surro-
gate's and orphans' courts, from which appeals were either not taken or
denied.
The cases have generally dealt' with death benefits payable under
combined profit sharing and pension plans which either were trusteed,
with payment being made directly by the trustee, or else involved insur-
ance companies and the annuity contract approach. There are varying
degrees of the vested interest of the employee, including the right to
3. A fairly typical example of the state inheritance tax statutes is Va. Code Ann.
§ 58-152 (1959), which provides in part as follows: "State inheritance taxes a- hereinafter
prescribed are hereby levied upon the shares of the respective beneficiaries in all property
within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth, real, personal and mixed, and any interest
therein, which shall pass ... (2) By grant or gift made or intended to take efflct in
possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor or donor . .. [or) (4) By a
transfer under which the transferrer has retained for his life the possession or enjoyment of
the property or the income therefrom or the right to designate or change the bhneficiaries
who shall be entitled to possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom. . . 2
4. In the 'Matter of Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal. 2d 594, 275 P.Zd 467 (1954) (municipal
government employees' death benefits); Dolak v. Tax Comm'r, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312
(1958) (unfunded and nontrusteed insurance retirement plan); Borchard v. Connelly, 140
Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953) (noncontributory plan-decedent retired and elected
survivorship annuity for spouse); People v. Schallerer, 12 Ill. 2d 240, 145 N.E.2d 585 (1957)
(privately purchased annuity); In re Brackett's Estate, 342 Mlich. 195, 69 NV.2d 164
(1955) (decedent's share of profit sharing plan); Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 497, 103 A2d
153 (1954) (employees' trust and retirement annuity payable to named beneficiary); In
the Matter of Estate of Endemann, 307 N.Y. 100, 120 N.E.2d S14 (1954) (EurivorAhip
annuity under municipal employees' pension plan); In re Estate of Daniel, 159 Ohio St.
109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953) (pension and profit sharing plan); In re Dorcey's Estate,
366 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951) (decedent's interest in Spars, Roebuck & Co. saing and
profit sharing plan); In re Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955) (benefits
paid under federal civil service retirement system).
5. Gould v. Johnson, 156 Mle. 446, 166 A.2d 4S1 (1960); In the Matter of Estate of
Clark, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960); In re Estate of Stone, 10 WL. 2d 467, 103
N.W.2d 663 (1960).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
designate a beneficiary. Most of the plans are noncontributory from
the employee's standpoint; that is, the employer is the sole contributor
to the plan. In about half of the cases, death has occurred after retire-
ment; in the remainder, death of the employee occurred prior to retire-
ment.
I. COMBINED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS
BY EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
One of the first reported state tax decisions under this heading, In re
Dorsey's Estate,6 arose in Pennsylvania in 1951. The fund involved was
composed of a portion of employees' wages, together with contributions
by the employer from profits. The death benefit could be paid to the
employee's designated beneficiary in the form of cash or could be used
to purchase annuities. The trustees had discretionary power to determine
the mode of payment and there was no reversion to the company. At
the time of his death, the total credits to the decedent's account in the
plan were valued at approximately $39,000, of which only about twelve
per cent was the decedent's contribution.
The Pennsylvania statute provided that the transfer inheritance tax
be imposed upon the transfer of any property made by a resident by
deed, grant or gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after the death of the grantor or donor.7 The question before the
Dorsey court was whether the decedent's share in the combined pension
and profit sharing plan was subject to taxation under this statute. The
court held that the interest of the deceased participant was vested, and
hence, subject to the state transfer inheritance tax. The court asserted:
[H]e had ... substantial ownership of his entire share of the fund and accordingly,
in transferring it to the beneficiary designated by him he was transferring not only
his own property to the extent that it represented contributions from his salary,
6. 366 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951). It has since been cited as a leading case in this field.
7. "A tax shall be, and is hereby, imposed upon the transfer of any property .., In the
following cases . . . (c) When the transfer is of property made by a resident ...by deed,
grant, bargain, sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the grantor, vendor, or
donor, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death." Pa.
Stat. Ann. fit. 72, § 2301 (1949). This section has been repealed insofar as It relates to
estates of decedents dying on or after January 1, 1962. Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 72, § 2301 (Supp.
1961). Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 72, § 2485-316 (Supp. 1961), effective January 1, 1962, specifically
exempts from taxation those payments made under pension, stock-bonus or profit sharing
plans to distributees designated by the decedent or in accordance with the terms of the
plan other than the estate of the decedent, to the extent that the decedent prior to death
did not otherwise have the right to possess, enjoy, assign or anticipate the payments so
made. Similarly, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §§ 2485-314, 2485-315 (Supp. 1961) exempt lump
sum Social Security death payments and lump sum Railroad Retirement burial payments.
[Vol. 31
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but also his own property to the extent that it represented his proportionate share of
the Company's contributions . .
As to the discretionary power held by the trustees to determine mode
of payment at the time of employee's withdrawal or in the event of his
death, the court held that this in no way limited the absolute right of
the employee to withdraw his share of the property in the fund or to
dispose of it at his death. The discretionary powers of the trustee gov-
erned only the form in which the employee or his estate would receive
the proceeds and had no contrary effect on the broad vesting features
inherent in the plan.
Thus, because of the extensive vesting aspect of the program, a valu-
able property right existed in the employee, and this was transferred to
the designated beneficiary upon the death of the employee. Such a trans-
fer was subject to the Pennsylvania transfer inheritance tax as a grant
or gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
death of the grantor or donor.'
II. CO-M3BINED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLAN WVITH CONTRI-
BUTIONS SOLELY By EMPLOYER
The leading case on this subject appears to be In re Estate of Daniel."
There, the plan was trusteed, and the retirement benefit was provided by
funds entirely contributed by the company. The company relinquished
all right of ownership in the fund which was payable, according to the
terms of the trust, to the participating employee on reaching retirement
age, or, on death, to a designated beneficiary changeable at will by the
employee. In the absence of a designation, the benefits were payable
to the estate of the employee.
The Ohio statute provided that property would be subject to inher-
itance taxation:
When the succession is to property from a resident ...by deed, grant, sale, assign-
ment, or gift, made without a valuable consideration . . . [and] intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after.., death .... U
The court held that the payment of the accumulated interest of the par-
ticipating employee to his designated beneficiary was a taxable succes-
sion under Ohio inheritance tax law since it was a transfer "intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after... death."' " The court
8. 366 Pa. at 562, 79 A.2d at 261.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953).
11. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5731.02(C) (Supp. 1962).
12. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5731.02(C) (2) (Supp. 1962).
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rejected the taxpayer's contention that the decedent had no ownership
in the fund at or prior to his death, so that the designation of a bene-
ficiary by him did not amount to a "succession" within the meaning of
the Ohio statute. Under the facts of the case the decedent possessed a
sufficient property right in the trust fund to bring it within the purview
of a taxable succession.
The trust fund belongs to the employees, each being the owner of his allotted portion,
although the actual possession and control thereof is postponed pending severance
or retirement of the employee. . . . In the meantime, each employee has a vested
property right in the trust fund. . . . The protection and preservation of such fund
from assignment, attachment or execution "prior to such actual payment or delivery"
does not have the effect of taking it out of the category of a "succession" as defined
by the provisions of the statute.13
No weight was given to the dissenting opinion in the intermediate ap-
pellate court, which would have ruled that there was no tax liability since
nothing passed from the decedent to the person named. According to
that theory, the property passed from the trustee to the designated bene-
ficiary upon the death of the employee. 14 That dissent also sharply distin-
guished the facts of the instant case from those in Dorsey and invoked
the doctrine of strict construction of the taxing statute; that is, that it
should be strictly construed against the taxing authority and liberally
construed with respect to the taxpayer in cases of ambiguity or doubt.
In re Brackett's Estate'5 involved substantially the same question as
Daniel. There, the employer deposited annually a percentage of its
profits with a trustee who clerically allocated each deposit among the
company's employees in proportion to the amount of their salaries. The
employee's interest in past contributions could not be impaired or re-
captured by the company, and an employee was entitled to his propor-
tionate share if his employment terminated for any reason. The
employee also had the sole right to designate a beneficiary.
The issue before the court was whether or not the deceased employee's
share of the profit sharing fund, passing to the beneficiary designated by
the employee, was taxable as a transfer intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment on or after the employee's death. In holding that the
death benefit was taxable under the Michigan inheritance tax statute,10
13. 159 Ohio St. at 113-14, 111 N.E.2d at 254-55.
14. 93 Ohio App. 123, 130, 112 N.E.2d 56, 60 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
15. 342 Mich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955).
16. "EA] tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property . .. In
the following cases . . . Third, When the transfer is of property made by a resident ...
by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the grantor,
vendor or donor or intended to take effect, in possession or enjoyment at or after such
death." Mich. Comp. Laws § 205.201 (1948).
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the court admitted that the case was one of first impression in Iichigan.
While it acknowledged that there were certain restrictions upon the
participant's dominion over the proceeds of the fund while held by the
trustee, it discussed at great length the property interest of the
decedent in the plan. Despite the fact that the participant could not
reduce the funds to his physical possession while he was still employed
by the company, the money belonged to the participant and could not
be recaptured by the company for its own use or benefit. Thus, the court
construed the plan to be in the nature of additional compensation earned
by the participant but deferred in enjoyment. It stated: "[T]he essence
of a transfer has come to be identified more nearly with a change of
economic benefits than with technicalities of title."' 7
Finally, the court replied to the strict construction argument' s by
declaring that taxation is a practical matter and taxing statutes must
be practically construed. Such provisions should not be interpreted so
narrowly as to defeat the manifest purpose or intent of the legislative
action.' 9
The results reached in Daniel and Brackett are identical as to taxable
effects. Both courts indicated that the decedent possessed a vested in-
terest sufficient to support the taxation of the property. In Dankl, the
theory that the decedent possessed a sufficient property right in the trust
fund was emphasized, -0 while in Brackett, the transfer of property rights
in the form of a substantial economic benefit derived from the contract
of employment was the major factor.
III. TRUSTEED PENSION AND RETIREMENT ANNUIT CONTRACTS PUR-
CHASED BY EMPLOYER
Cruthzers v. Neel&' concerned a trusteed plan where the company pur-
chased and paid the premiums on retirement group annuities pursuant
to an employees' trust. The trustee was designated as the sole owner of
17. 342 MTich. at 206, 69 N.W.2d at 169.
13. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
19. 342 Mlich. at 205, 69 N.W.2d at 169.
20. On facts similar to Daniel and involving essentially the same type of plan, the
Supreme judidal Court of Maine held in Gould v. Johnson, 156 Me. 446, 166 A.2d 431
(1960) that designation of his wife by the decedent to receive his death benefits constitutLd
a grant of an interest in property within the statutory meaning of a transfer of an interest
in property made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment on or after death
of the grantor or donor. The court declined to accept the widow's contention that the
decedent had at most a "mere expectancy" coupled with a spcdal and limited power of
appointment, neither of which would be subject to the Maine inheritance tax. This care
was one of first impression for the Maine court.
21. 14 N.J. 497, 103 A.2d 153 (1954).
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the contract with the right to designate the beneficiary thereof. Provision
was made for monthly payments to the decedent during his lifetime after
retirement, with a guarantee of 120 monthly payments. In the event
of the participant's death prior to retirement the contract provided
for payment to the beneficiary of an amount equal to the cash surrender
value thereof, or to the total premiums paid, whichever was the greater.
Although the premiums on the various contracts were paid by the em-
ployer through the medium of the trustee, there was withheld from
employee's salaries an amount which represented his contribution
towards the cost of the benefits.
About nine months prior to his scheduled retirement from the company,
the decedent died, still in the employ of the company. Apparently he
could, and did, designate his widow to receive the payments, in event of
his death. As a result of the death before retirement, the insurance com-
panies were obligated to repay to the named beneficiary the total pre-
miums paid on the contracts. These proceeds were included by the State
of New Jersey in the decedent's gross estate, and pursuant to statute22
were taxed as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after death.
In arguing that the death benefit was excludable from inheritance tax-
ation, the estate contended that the benefit was comparable to life insur-
ance proceeds and should be omitted under the general exclusion provision
for life insurance proceeds. It was also vehemently maintained that
inasmuch as the trustee was the designated owner of the policy, nothing
passed to the beneficiary from the decedent, either at or after his death.
The court rejected the life insurance exemption argument on the grounds
that the policies lacked the necessary risk elements and were quite con-
trary to the risks ordinarily associated with life insurance. As to the
trustee's ownership, the court stated in part:
Fanciful rationalism must give way to a realistic and analytical interpretation of
the documents under scrutiny, and such treatment discloses the policies in question to
be retirement annuity contracts. In this status it becomes unimportant what interest,
equitable or otherwise, the decedent had in the proceeds, for the tax is on the
succession rather than on any divesting of the transferor's ownership.28
Thus, the court held the succession tax falls upon a beneficiary's suc-
cession to property rather than upon the decedent's "interest" in
22. "[A] tax shall be and is hereby imposed . . . upon the transfer of property . . .
in the following cases . . . c. Where real or tangible personal property within this State
of a resident of this State . . . is transferred by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made In
contemplation of the death of the grantor, vendor or donor, or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after such death." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:34-1 (1960).
23. 14 N.J. at 502-03, 103 A.2d at 156.
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property. The inheritance tax assessment upon the widow's receipt of
the contract proceeds was affirmed even though the company had paid
the premiums and the trustee was sole owner of the contracts. It appears
that the case can be reconciled with those holding that the decedent
possessed a sufficient property right to constitute a valuable economic
interest passing as a transfer intended to take effect at or after his death.
A recent case similar to Cruthers is In the Matter of Estate of Clark."
There, too, the employee was covered by a retirement plan group annuity
contract. In Clark, however, the premiums were equally divided between
the employer and the employee. The employee was entitled to receive a
lifetime annuity upon retirement and had the right to designate and
change the beneficiary under the death benefit clause. If the employee
died before retirement while annuities purchased with his contributions
were in force, the insurance company would pay a single sum death
benefit to the named beneficiary in an amount equal to the accumulation
of the employee's purchase payments.
The decedent died while still an employee, having named his wife as
beneficiary under the death benefit clause of the contract. She failed
to include the amount received under the contract in the inheritance
tax report upon the decedent's estate, contending that the proceeds were
in the nature of life insurance benefits payable to a named beneficiary,
hence, not subject to inheritance taxation. The court rejected this
contention and proceeded to distinguish between annuity contracts and
contracts of life insurance.2a In holding the proceeds received under the
death benefit clause to be subject to inheritance taxation as property
passing by a gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death, the court cited many cases with similar holdings but failed
to mention Cruthers, which appears to be more closely in point factually
than any of the authorities cited.
Thus, the decision in Clark, like that of Cruthers, seems to be recon-
cilable with those cases holding that the decedent was possessed of a
sufficient property right or valuable economic interest which passed at
death and was therefore subject to state transfer inheritance tax.
IV. SURVVoRsHIP ANNUITIES
One of the earliest cases involving the inheritance taxation of a sur-
vivorship annuity was Borchard v. Connelly.20 There, an annuity was
24. 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960).
25. Id. at 430-31, 354 P.2d at 114. It should be noted, however, that this was the
opinion of a divided court, the two dissenting judges agreeing with plaintiff's exclusionary
theory.
26. 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953).
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issued to the decedent in 1920 by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America. All of the premiums were paid by Yale Uni-
versity under a special arrangement with the decedent, and were in addi-
tion to his salary. Subsequently, the decedent chose to exercise an option
which provided for monthly payments beginning July 1, 1950 and in
the event of his death, if the sum of payments should be less than the
guaranteed minimum return under the contract, the annuity payments
would continue to be paid to the surviving annuitant until that amount
was reached. Upon decedent's death the computed value of the unpaid
installments was about $16,000 and this was included in the decedent's
estate as a "gift or grant intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after the death of the transferor,) 27 and also as a transfer
under which the decedent retained for his life ... (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in
conjunction with any person or persons, to designate the person or persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom .... 28
In affirming the taxability of the survivor's annuity, the court stated
that it was the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting Section 12-
341 of the Connecticut General Statutes, to reach, for purposes of suc-
cession taxation, the "economic benefits" or the "economic interests."
The fact that Yale University paid the premiums on the contract did not,
in the court's opinion, alter the fact that the annuity contract was the
property of the decedent, since the contractual obligation of the insur-
ance company ran directly to the decedent. It was the decedent's annu-
ity, and it was the decedent who made the transfer of an interest in
property to his wife when he exercised an option in her favor.
Prior to statutory change in 1959, New York held that the value of
survivorship annuities were subject to estate tax. The controlling case
was In the Matter of Estate of Endemann.0 There, the decedent, an
employee of New York City and a member of the city's employee retire-
ment system, selected an option upon retirement, which provided for a
reduced annuity for himself and his widow after his death. A unanimous
court held that the selection of this option constituted a transfer of
property by the decedent to his wife which was intended to take effect
27. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 12-341(d) (Supp. 1961). Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 12-349
(Supp. 1961) now excludes from the decedent's gross estate the value of employee death
benefit payments, to beneficiaries other than the decedent's estate, from plans exempt from
federal income taxation except such proportion as represents the decedent's contribution.
For purposes of determining such contributions, those made by the decedent's employer
are not to be considered as having been donated by the decedent.
28. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 12-341(d) (Supp. 1961).
29. 307 N.Y. 100, 120 N.E.2d 514 (1954).
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at death." The court rejected the argument of the surviving annuitant
to the effect that the transfer was completed when the decedent chose
the option and that, therefore, nothing took effect upon his death. Like-
wise, the contention that what the decedent did at his retirement was
"merely to renounce part of his retirement rights in favor of his wife,
like a legatee 'renouncing' a legacy"'" did not meet with judicial
approval. The court stated:
Here, Endemann had built up for himself, by contributions of money and services,
a fund which, at retirement, he had a contractual right to dispose of in any one of
several ways-he chose a way which involved a transfer to his vife, effective at
his death.32
Thus, Endenwm held that the total amount of the survivorship annu-
ity was subject to inheritance taxation, even though the employer had
been the primary contributor. A year after this decision, the New York
State Legislature amended the Tax Law,3 effective in 1959, so as to
modify the Endemann rule. The amendment provided that under any
plan which meets the general qualification provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code3" payments to the beneficiary of the annuity are excluded
from the decedent's gross estate, for purposes of inheritance taxation,
in the same proportion that contributions to the plan were made by the
decedent. For purposes of determining such contributions under this
amendment those made by the decedent's employer are to be considered
as having been contributed by the decedent, if made by reason of his
employment.
30. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property "(a) To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer ... (iii) intended to taLe
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death." N.Y. Sees. Lawvs 1954, ch. 10, § 1.
31. 307 N.Y. at 107-0, 120 N.E.2d at 51S.
32. Id. at 10S, 120 N.E.2d at 513. Became the decedent was a member of the New York
City Employees' Retirement System, a constitutional question was involved as to whether
the New York Constitution forbade the taxing of this type of annuity. N.Y. Const.
art. XVI, § 5 provides: "All salaries, wages and other compemation, except pensions, paid
to officers and employees of the state and its subdivisions and agencies shall be subject to
taxation." The surrogate's court held that while the transfer was one intended to take
effect at death, the transfer could not be taxed because the state constitution prohibited the
taxing of "pensions." 201 Misc. 1077, 105 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Surr. CL 1951). The appellate
division held that the constitutional exclusion was not applicable to retirement pay. 282
App. Div. 76S, 122 N.Y.S.2d 6S2 (2d Dep't 1953) (memorandum decision). The court
of appeals affirmed, stating that the word "pensions" was added to the above section of
the constitution out of an abundance of caution to make sure that the section could not
be construed to make pensions subject to income tax, since they were already exempt
from income tax under another section of the statute. 307 N.Y. at 1C6, 120 N.E2d at 517.
33. N.Y. Tax Laws § 249-r.
34. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b).
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Survivorship annuities which may be elected by members of the armed
services under the military retirement plan35 apparently are to receive
no preferred treatment over privately purchased annuities or insured
commercial plans. An opinion of the Corporation Counsel of the District
of Columbia, dated September 23, 1955, holding that survivorship annu-
ities payable under the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of
195330 were subject to inheritance taxation in the District of Columbia,
reads in part as follows:
The 1953 Act created a new right in retired members of the uniformed services by
allowing an election to receive reduced retirement pay, and thereby provide annuities
for their widows. Both decedents here involved, by irrevocable .election, reduced the
retirement which they were receiving at the time of their election and thereby pro-
vided annuities for their widows, which were to take effect in possession and enjoy-
ment upon the retired member's death.37
In general, then, state inheritance taxation of a survivorship annuity
as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death seems fairly well established. The right to designate a bene-
ficiary and the substantial shifting of economic interests from the decedent
to the beneficiary appear clearly sufficient for the imposition of the tax.
V. NONCONTRIBUTORY, UNFUNDED, AND NONTRUSTEED INSURANCE
RETIREMENT PLAN-DECEDENT NoT RETIED
Dolak v. Tax Comm'r s is a Connecticut decision holding retirement
plan benefits to be subject to inheritance taxation. There, the retirement
plan was noncontributory, unfunded, and nontrusteed. It gave the em-
ployee no rights and did not cover him if he left the company for any
reason other than death or retirement. The company reserved the right
to discontinue or modify the plan at any time, with the exception that
benefits being paid to retired employees would not be reduced. The
decedent, at the time of his death, was actively employed by the company
and under the plan's death benefit option had elected to make his wife
beneficiary of an annuity, rather than of the normal lump sum payment.
At no time, either before or after election, had the decedent become
entitled personally to receive any retirement allowance or other money
benefit under the plan.
Pursuant to the decedent's election to take a death benefit option, the
company made monthly payments to the spouse. The court noted that
the lower court had held such annuity payments not subject to inheritance
35. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1431-33 (1958).
36. 67 Stat. 501 (1953). This act was repealed, 70A Stat. 641 (1956), but was later
re-enacted in toto, 10 U.S.C. § 1431-33 (1958).
37. Opinion of the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, Sept. 23, 1955.
38. 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958).
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taxation on the ground of lack of an enforceable contract during the
decedent's lifetime;39 the decedent's wife did not succeed to anything
that the decedent owned, since the decedent had only a mere expectancy
and had owned nothing. On appeal, this finding was unanimously re-
versed.40 Apparently for the first time, the Connecticut court held the
surviving spouse to be a third party contingent beneficiary whose rights
became fixed upon the decedent's death. The tax was imposed upon the
theory that the decedent parted with valuable consideration in favor of
his company in exchange for contractual obligations running not only to
himself, but also directly to his spouse as a contingent third party bene-
ficiary. Such benefits as finally accrued to the contingent third party
beneficiary took effect in possession and enjoyment at the death of the
decedent within the meaning of the Connecticut statute.4
A nontax case decided on the ground that the surviving wife was a
third party beneficiary of a valid contract, with a vested though defeasible
interest, is Buehler v. Buehler.42 There, the defendant was the second
wife and surviving widow of an intestate decedent. The decedent was a
participant in an employees' profit sharing retirement plan which pro-
vided that certain benefits would accrue to the deceased upon his retire-
ment, resignation, dismissal, disability, or death. The defendant was
designated by the decedent as beneficiary of these benefits. A suit was
instituted by the plaintiff as the decedent's only child, alleging that the
designation of the beneficiary under the plan was testamentary in char-
acter and not executed with the formality required under the statute of
wills. The trial court awarded the plaintiff his intestate share of the
contested benefits.
The appellate court reversed, and took the view that the designation
of the beneficiary was not testamentary in character. It held that the
defendant was a third party beneficiary of a valid contract and compared
this type of contract to the purchase of Series E United States Savings
Bonds in which benefits were paid to the owner or his spouse. Such a
contract gives the spouse a vested, though defeasible, contractual right
which has been held not to be testamentary.
VI. REFUND ANNUITY' CONTRACTS PRIVATELY PURCHASED
People v. Schallerer4 3 has been described as a "case of first impression
in Illinois."4' The annuity contracts concerned provided for a fixed
39. Id. at 502, 144 A.2d at 315.
40. 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1953).
41. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 12-341 (Supp. 1961).
42. 323 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
43. 12 11. 2d 240, 145 N.E.2d 5SS (1957).
44. Id. at 244, 149 NE.2d at 587.
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annual stipend for a definite period of time or for so long as the annuitant
should live, with a provision that if he died before receiving the stipu-
lated amount, i.e., the purchase price of the contract plus interest, then
the difference between that sum and the annuities received was to be
paid to a named beneficiary of the annuitant. The issue was whether the
balance remaining to be paid on the contract to the named beneficiary
constituted a transfer of property "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after . . . death.14 5
In holding that the proceeds of the refund annuity payable to the
named beneficiary were taxable as a transfer intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at the death of the grantor, the court based its
opinion on the transfer of a valuable economic interest over which the
donor retained control during his life. In reaching this conclusion, it
cited with approval similar cases in other jurisdictions. 0
VII. STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT RETIREMENT PLANS
It has been noted previously that a survivorship annuity was held
subject to inheritance taxation in In the Matter of Estate of Endemann,7
and further that in that case the decedent Endemann was a member of
the New York City retirement system. Ordinarily, retirement plans
created by state or municipal governments embrace two fundamental
concepts so far as taxation is concerned: first, most governmental retire-
ment plans call for contribution by the employee as well as by the em-
ployer, and it is not unlikely that the employee may make the more
substantial contribution; and second, statutes creating state or municipal
retirement plans usually contain comprehensive provisions exempting
the proceeds of the plan from levy, garnishment, attachment, and other
legal process, and from all state and local taxation.48
The State of New York, as indicated by Endemann, is one of the few
45. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 375 (1959).
46. These cases included Gregg v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 315 Mass. 704, 54
N.E.2d 169 (1944); Gar6s v. State Tax Comm'n, 99 N.H. 319, 109 A.2d 844 (1954); In
the Matter of Estate of Atkins, 129 NJ. Eq. 186, 18 A.2d 45 (Prerogative Ct. 1941); In
re Bayer's Estate, 345 Pa. 308, 26 A.2d 202 (1942).
47. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. Endemann has been cited by various
New York Surrogate's Court opinions as controlling the taxability of survivorship annuities.
See, e.g., In re Harbord's Estate, 132 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
48. The Virginia exemption, which is typical of state legislation exempting such
proceeds, is applicable to the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System and reads as
follows: "Retirement allowances and other benefits accrued or accruing to any person
under the provisions of this chapter, and the assets of the retirement system created under
this chapter, are hereby exempted from any State, county, or municipal tax, and shall not
be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment. . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 51-111.15 (1958).
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jurisdictions which has amended its constitution so that all retirement
benefits (except pensions, which are actually gratuities) are subject to
state taxation. 9 Thus, so far as New York is concerned, all doubt as to
the applicability of an exemption from taxation for state and municipal
employees' retirement proceeds is removed. No special benefit is ex-
tended to any particular class of employees.
In California, the County Employees Retirement Lawn° originally
provided a general exemption from taxation for retirement allowances.
This statute was construed in Matter of Estate of Simpson,"' a case con-
cerning the Los Angeles County Employees' Retirement Fund. The
decedent died prior to retirement, designating his wife as beneficiary
under the fund. Accordingly, the widow eventually received $15,856.26,
of which $7,676.42 represented a return of contributions paid by dece-
dent to the retirement fund. The sole question in the case was whether
the payment received by the widow was exempt from inheritance taxation
under the general exemption provisions in the law.
The court held the death benefits taxable and the contended exemption
inapplicable on the theory that where a statute provides for specific ex-
ceptions from the operation of another statute, general in its terms, the
exceptions must be strictly construed, and thus any doubt as to a right
of exemption must be resolved against the exemption. The court, there-
fore, upheld the Controller's contention that the statutory exemption
under section 31452 was applicable to property taxation but not to inher-
itance taxation.
The California legislature apparently took note of this decision, for
the statute was amended the following year specifically to exempt from
inheritance taxation the retirement allowances of county employees,
thereby expressly overruling the Simpson result. Thus, while New York,
by constitutional amendment, allows state inheritance taxation of local
or state government retirement plans, California specifically exempts
such benefits. This demonstrates the necessity for careful scrutiny of the
particular state constitution and statutes when confronted with the issue
of state inheritance taxation, especially of municipal or state retirement
plans.
49. NY. Const. art. XVI, § 5; see note 32 supra.
50. "The right of a person to a pension, annuity, retirement allovance, return of con-
tributions. . . [is] exempt from taxation, whether state, county, municipal, or dis-
trict . .. 2' Cal. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 424, § 1, as amended, Cal. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 199,
§ 1.
51. 43 Cal. 2d 594, 275 P.2d 467 (1954).
52. "The right of a person to a pension, annuity, retirement allowance, return of
contributions ... [is] exempt from taxation, including any inheritance tax, whether state,
county, municipal, or district.. . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 314S2.
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VIII. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RETIREMENT PLANS AND UNITED
STATES CIVIL SERVICE BENEFITS
Whether benefits paid under the Civil Service Retirement Act of 195611
are subject to state inheritance taxation depends upon the nature of the
benefit. There are at least six different types of payments made under
the act. One of the benefits provides for an annuity to become payable
to the surviving spouse of a deceased federal government employee,
where the death of the employee occurs after five years of federal service,
but prior to retirement of the employee."4
Efforts to impose a state inheritance tax on an annuity payable to the
widow of a nonretired federal employee, whose death occurs after five
years of federal service, have been successfully resisted by the widow
in at least two jurisdictions. In Capps v. District of Columbia,5 the
decedent was a United States Government civil service employee for
over forty-one years. He was not retired at the time of his death, and
the total credit in his account with the Civil Service Commission was
$9,301.13. Upon his death the widow received an annuity of $188 per
month for her lifetime or until her remarriage. No part of the annuity
was included in the inheritance tax return filed with the District Assessor.
Upon assessment of an inheritance tax deficiency, the taxpayer paid the
tax and filed an application for refund.
The Board of Tax Appeals determined that the widow received her
annuity as a result of a 1954 amendment to the Civil Service Retirement
Act, providing for the first time that widows of those federal employees
who died while in active service should receive annuities. 0 This was a
right, not transferred from the decedent, but created by statute; there-
fore the court granted the petitioner the refund she sought. The fact that
the decedent possessed certain rights under the Civil Service Retirement
Act which hd declined to exercise during his lifetime, did not bring these
rights within the purview of the inheritance tax laws. Such rights, said
the court, were extinguished at the moment of the death of the decedent,
and nothing further passed at his death by reason of their prior existence.
In re Estate of Sweet" reached the same result as Capps, in an iden-
tical fact situation, but without the assistance of the Capps decision,
which was not cited in either the majority or the dissenting opinion.
The Wisconsin Department of Taxation included in the decedent's gross
53. 70 Stat. 743, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2251-67 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
54. 70 Stat. 754, 5 U.S.C. § 2260(c) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
55. CCH Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (7th ed.) 1 17328 (D.C. Feb. 6, 1951).
56. 68 Stat. 23 (1954), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 2261 (1958).
57. 270 Wis. 256, 70 NAV.2d 645 (1955).
[Vol. 31
STATE TAXATION
estate, as a transfer intended to take effect in possession upon the em-
ployee's death, the present worth of annuity benefits payable to the
widow of a deceased federal government employee, actively employed at
the time of his death.
The majority opinion, holding the annuity not taxable under the Wis-
consin Inheritance Tax Act,18 relied on a 1910 Wisconsin decisionO9
(dealing apparently with the taxation of insurance policies in an inter
vivos trust), and upon certain decisions of New York courts"1 rendered
after the adoption of the Wisconsin act, which was modeled on the New
York statute.
The vigorous dissenting opinion would have held the annuity benefits
taxable under the statute, and cited as authority Borchard v. Connelly,"'
In re Brackett's Estate,62 Crutthers v. Neeld, 3 In re Estate of Daniel,"'
and In re Dorsey's Estate." The dissent concluded:
It might be argued that these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because
the employees in those cases possessed the right to designate the beneficiary. We do
not consider the lack of any right on the part of the employee to name or change
the beneficiary prevents a taxable transfer occurring. It is the performing of services
by the employee under terms of employment calling for the payment of the annuity
to the beneficiary upon death that constitutes the acts on the part of the employee
which effects the transfer.06
Earlier, the dissent had stated:
The employee by voluntarily rendering services for the federal government under the
terms of employment heretofore described performed the acts which effected the
transfer to his widow. The part of his salary withheld to fund the annuity stands
in the same category as if he had been paid his salary in full and from such pay-
ments he had therefrom paid back to the government the amount of his share of the
contributions. The additional contributions made into the fund by the government
were in no sense a gift or gratuity by the government but constituted in effect
additional compensation for the services the employee performed and were in direct
ratio to such services measured in dollars of salary earned.G7
58. Mis. Stat. § 72.01(3) (b) (1959).
59. In re Bullen's Estate, 143 Vis. 512, 128 N.W. 109 (1910).
60. In the Matter of Estate of Voorhees, 200 App. Div. 259, 193 N.Y. Supp. 163 (3d
Dep't 1922); In the Matter of Estate of ,Ilson, 143 Misc. 742, 257 N.Y. Supp. 230 (Surr.
Ct. 1931); In the Matter of Estate of Haedrich, 134 Misc. 741, 236 N.Y. Supp. 395 (Surr.
Ct. 1929).
61. 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953).
62. 342 Mlich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955).
63. 14 N.J. 497, 103 A.2d 153 (1954).
64. 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953).
65. 366 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951).
66. 270 Vis. at 264-65, 70 N.W.2d at 650 (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 264, 70 N.W.2d at 650 (dissenting opinion).
1963]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Such reasoning also finds support in Miller v. Commissioner8 wherein
it was stated that a civil service employee, who has a right to receive
an annuity upon retirement and to receive a return of the amount with-
held from his salary with interest upon separation or death, has a vested
right under the Civil Service Retirement Act.
If the majority of the court in Sweet side-stepped the main issue in the
case by relying on a former decision which apparently was not in point,
the vigorous dissenting opinion may be said to have gone too far in order
to sustain taxation. The dissenting justices were clear in that they would
be inclined to hold that the mere performance of services by the em-
ployee under the terms of his employment was sufficient to constitute a
transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the death of the grantor. It is submitted that none of the leading cases
cited by the dissenting opinion go quite this far. In each instance the
flow of economic benefits to the surviving annuitant was due to some-
thing in addition to the deceased employee's contract of employment;
namely, the specific designation by the deceased employee of the surviving
annuitant. In Sweet, the surviving annuitant was not designated by the
decedent. Her designation as an annuitant was a result of the statutory
terms governing her husband's employment with the federal government.
Under the facts of that case, and under the applicable provisions of the
Civil Service Retirement Act, Mr. Sweet did not possess the right to
prevent the annuity from going to his widow. She was the statutory
beneficiary. Had Mr. Sweet lived and retired under the applicable pro-
visions of the statute, he could then have made certain elections which
would have defeated entirely any benefits to Mrs. Sweet. On the other
hand, had Mr. Sweet lived to retirement, he could have elected to receive
a reduced annuity for himself, and a survivorship annuity for his spouse,
should she survive him. 9 The election by a retired federal employee of
a reduced annuity, and the payment of a survivorship annuity to a
designated beneficiary under the Civil Service Retirement Act would
clearly create a situation identical to that in the leading cases cited by
the dissent;70 that is, a transfer of property intended to take effect in
68. 144 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1944). This case was not cited in Sweet.
69. 70 Stat. 753 (1956), 5 U.S.C. § 2259(g) (1958) (election of reduced annuity by
married employee); and 70 Stat. 753 (1956), 5 U.S.C. § 2259(h) (1958) (election of
reduced annuity by unmarried employee).
70. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the Postal
Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-793, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Oct. 11, 1962), amending 70 Stat. 754 (1956), 5 U.S.C.'§ 2260 (1958) (Supp. 1959-1961)
provides that a survivorship annuity be payable automatically to a surviving spouse unless
the federal employee, at the time he retires, elects in writing an annuity for himself only.
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possession or enjoyment at the death of the employee and, hence, ordin-
arily taxable.
The rationale of the dissenting opinion, if carried to its logical con-
clusion, would include in a decedent's estate annuities payable under the
Social Security laws and under the Railroad Retirement laws, since
under those statutes also, an employee possesses no right to change the
beneficiary designated by the statute. Yet no recorded cases are
available in which the social security annuity has been includible in a
decedent's gross estate as a transfer intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at the death of the employee.
Unfortunately, the reasoning of the District of Columbia Board of
Tax Appeals decision in Capps is in accord with neither the majority
nor the dissent in Sweet. The facts in the two cases are identical, and
the annuity payable to the surviving spouse in each case was paid to her
as the statutory beneficiary under the Civil Service Retirement Act,
rather than as the beneficiary designated by the decedent. In seeking
to establish and maintain tax liability, the District Assessor made much
argument of the fact that the decedent was entitled to retire, and that
if he had retired, he could have elected to exercise rights which might
have resulted in his estate's becoming the beneficiary of certain funds,
or might have resulted in a reduced survivorship annuity to his surviving
spouse. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, noted that it is not the
unexercised rights of the decedent which are taxable under the statute,
but rather the transfer of property.
The effect of Sweet, however, was subsequently limited and dis-
tinguished by the Wisconsin court's opinion in In re Estate of Stone.:1
That case involved the election of a joint and survivorship annuity by
the decedent in favor of his wife, if she survived him. The plan was a
qualified trusteed plan, and although the decedent was eligible under
the plan to retire and receive immediate benefits, he had not done so.
Before the 1962 amendment, a retiring employee had to designate specifically hL Epauce to
receive a survivorship annuity. This dezignation, or election, constituted a gift or grant
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death and, hence, the basis of the
jurisdiction to tax the survivores annuity. The 1962 amendment, however, relieve- the
retiring federal employee of making the election. Query: Will the absence of the retiring
employee's election tend to remove the survivor's annuity from the category of a taxable
transfer? The answer is not dear. According to the rationale of the Capps case, the un-
exercised rights of the decedent are not taxable. Further, does it appear that each retiring
employee who fails to elect in writing an annuity for himself is thereby providing his
surviving spouse with a survivorship annuity "by operation of law"? On the other hand,
may the survivor's annuity be includible in the decedent's gross estate because of the
"relinquishment of a power to appoint"?
71. 10 Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663 (1960).
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The election of the joint and survivor's annuity and the designation of
his wife as beneficiary were held to be a transfer of whatever interest
the decedent had in the employee's trust fund, and subject to inheritance
taxation as a transfer intended to take effect in lossession or enjoyment
at death. Sweet was distinguished because Mrs. Sweet became entitled
to the annuity by operation of law which controlled the retirement system
and not because of any option exercised by the employee in her favor.
Thus, Sweet was considered limited to only those benefits which, under
the particular retirement plan, were payable to the beneficiary upon the
death of the nonretired employee who did not possess any option as to
the distribution of benefits.
IX. EMPLOYEE DEATH PAYMENTS
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides a special exclusion
from income taxation for certain payments if made to a deceased em-
ployee's beneficiaries by reason of the death of the employee.7 2 The
payment to the beneficiary need not be made by an express contract. A
voluntary payment by the employer qualifies for the exclusion under the
Code.
Whether a benefit paid under Section 101 (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code is subject to state taxation will depend upon the nature of
the payment. Is it made by an employer as the result and as a part of a
qualified retirement plan? Is it insurance coverage carried by the em-
ployer for this specific purpose? Has the employer given an outright
gratuity to the deceased employee's beneficiary? It is necessary to know
in what manner and from what funds a death benefit under section 101 (b)
is paid before the state tax consequence can be determined.
If the payment is made under insurance coverage carried by the em-
ployer it will most likely be exempted from inheritance taxation under
the general exclusion for life insurance. If the deceased employee, while
alive, had no vested rights in the ultimate benefit (as for example, where
he was ineligible to meet vesting requirements) and the lump sum benefit
is voluntarily paid to his beneficiary, the payment would appear to be
in the nature of a gratuity and, hence, not includible in the decedent's
gross estate for inheritance tax purposes.
The gratuity payment, however, contains a pitfall for the employer.
He may find himself subject to the state's gift tax statutes in the case of
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b). This section excludes from gross income (subject
to a $5,000 limitation from each employer of the deceased employee) the amounts received,
whether in a lump sum or in installments, by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee,
if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid by reason of the
death of the employee.
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gratuitous payments made under section 101(b). Twelve states impose
state gift taxes, 73 which usually follow the pattern of the state's inheritance
tax laws and are designed to reach all transfers by gift, where the prop-
erty is within the jurisdiction of the state.
It appears settled in Wisconsin that gratuitous payments to the bene-
ficiary of a deceased employee, not paid according to an established plan
for paying company funds as additional compensation or pension benefits,
are subject to the state's gift tax laws.74 The decisions turn on the fact
that the payments are plainly gratuitous in nature, the company having
no legal obligation-contractual or otherwise-to make death benefit or
pension payments such as these. A gratuitous payment to an employee
is, of course, a transfer coming within the scope of gift tax statutes,
unless otherwise specifically excluded.
If the payment is made as part of a qualified plan, it would appear to
be includible in the deceased employee's gross estate and subject to
inheritance taxation, since the payment would apparently be part of the
contractual obligation between employee and employer, in which the
employee had acquired some vested rights.
73. They are California, Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, O!dahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. 1 P-H State &
Local Tax Serv. f 101 (1962).
74. Spangler v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 255 Wis. 51, 37 NAV.2d 857 (1949);
Oshkosh Trunks & Luggage Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, CCH Inh., Est. & Gift
Tax Rep. (7th ed.) 1 17225 (Wis. July 26, 1950). Similarly, payments were held to be
gifts and not pensions in Brindley v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, CCH Inb., Est. &
Gift Tax Rep. (7th ed.) ff 19191 (Wis. March 17, 1960). In Brindley, the Spangler dcci-
non was held to be directly in point. In order for the payments not to constitute gifts,
the corporation must have a continuing plan of payment. There must be a sustained and
continued obligation. The payment must not be sporadic or result from occasional impulse.
In Brindley, the taxpayer failed to show that the transfers resulted from a sustained and
continued obligation, or were made under a continuing plan of payment to widow. of
deceased corporate officers. Boylan-Pearce, Inc. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 532, 126 S.E.2d
492 (1962), reached a contrary result, but was based on the application of the North
Carolina statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-147(23) (1958) provides that in computing net
income, "the amount of salary or other compensation of an employee which is paid for a
period of not more than twenty-four months after the employee's death to his estate,
widow, or heirs provided such payment is made in recognition of sermices rendered by the
employee prior to his death and is reasonable in amount" would be deductible. In Boylan-
Pearce, thirteen months after the death of its president, the family corporation passed
resolutions authorizing the payment of z36,000 to the widow of the deceased president. The
Commissioner of Revenue required the taxpayer corporation to pay a gift tax and refused
to allow a deduction for business expenses. On appeal this ruling %was reversed, and the
taxpayer was held not liable for gift tax. The question of whether the proceeds consti-
tuted income to the widow recipient was not before the court and was therefore left
unanswered.
19631
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
X. VALUATION OF ANNUITY INCLUDIBLE IN DECEDENT'S GROSS ESTATE
Once it is determined that an annuity is subject to state inheritance
taxation, the next question is that of valuation for the purpose of in-
cluding it in the gross estate. This valuation problem was discussed by
the court of appeals in the Endemann decision,"m in which the state
calculated the value of the widow's annuity by estimating the value of
an immediate single life annuity for a person aged seventy-three.
Endemann was entitled to a choice of several ways to take his annuity. He
elected a survivorship annuity that entitled him to an annuity of $3,140.60
for his lifetime, with an annuity of half that amount going to his wife
for her lifetime after his death. The choice, once made, was irrevocable.
Endemann was seventy-five years of age when he died; his wife was
seventy-three. Based on the actuaries' combined experience table of
mortality, with interest at four per cent, the present value of $1.00 due
at the end of each year during the life of a person aged seventy-three
is $5.45928. Thus the value of Mrs. Endemann's annuity in the case was
calculated at $1,570.20 times $5.45928, or $8,572.16. The inheritance
tax on the sum involved was $85.72.
The Surrogate had decided that it was erroneous for the state to value
Mrs. Endemann's annuity as a single life annuity for a person aged
seventy-three. 76 Since her rights were those of a surviving annuitant,
the court had held that their value must be estimated as of 1947, the
date of death of the primary annuitait, Endemann.77
The Surrogate's method of calculation, which was affirmed by the
appellate division,78 had been to compute the value on an initial reserve
basis as follows: 79 The decedent had an "initial reserve" in the retire-
ment system of $34,183.04. He took for himself an annual retirement
annuity allowance of $3,140.60. As a result of payment of this annuity
through the years, the amount of $28,668.60 of the "initial reserve" was
consumed. This left a balance in the "initial reserve" of $5,514.44, and
this balance constituted the value of the annuity which Endemann
arranged for his wife. This was the value at the time of his retirement,
to which was applied proportionately the receipt of his annuity, and the
balance remaining at the time of his death was the value to the surviving
annuitant.
75. 307 N.Y. 100, 120 N.E.2d 514 (1954).
76. 201 Misc. 1077, 1083, 106 N.Y.S.2d 849, 855 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
77. Ibid.
78. 282 App. Div. 768, 122 N.Y.S.2d 682 (2d Dep't 1953) (memorandum decision).
79. This calculation of the survivor's annuity was not expressly set out in the surro-
gate's opinion, but was detailed in the appellate division's memorandum as the valuation
which the evidence indicated bad been used. Id. at 769, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85.
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The court of appeals, however, declined to go along with this method
of valuation. In fact, the opposing litigants both agreed that the appellate
division's method of valuation could not possibly be correct, since it
assumed that a certain proportion of the "initial reserve" was the correctly
calculated value of Mrs. Endemann's annuity and there was no proof
that the reserve was so calculated. Even if the valuation were assumed to
be correct, the court pointed out that this was not the value to be taxed.
The thing to be taxed was the value of the transfer, i.e., the annuity, to
Mrs. Endemann when she took it. The method of calculating this value
is set forth in the New York statute, 0 and the state's appraiser correctly
applied it by estimating the value of a single life annuity for a person,
age seventy-three. The court concluded by stating that all valuations
of prospective future interests must be made on the basis of pure
formulae.
A. The Valuation of Annuities for Inheritance Ta.. Purposes
The inheritance tax, being a tax on the right to receive, is measured by
the share of the estate passing to the particular beneficiary. Therefore,
it is the value of the annuity to the survivor when the survivor takes
which is properly the subject of the inheritance tax. As a practical
matter, this valuation may be determined in one of two ways: first, as
the present value of $1.00 based on the actuaries' combined experience
table, due at the end of each year during the life of a person of a certain
age. This was New York's method of calculation, finally affirmed in
Endermann. It has the advantage of simplicity, and it is fairly precise
when measured in terms of what the surviving annuitant is entitled to.
Many inheritance tax jurisdictions provide by statute, or by administra-
tive regulation, for the use of the actuaries' combined experience table,
or other mortality table, in calculating the valuation of any annuity,
including a survivorship annuity.81 The interest rate upon which the
actuaries' combined experience tables of mortality (or tables of "present
values") are based, varies from state to state, and this may cause the
value for an annuitant of the same age to vary slightly, but not signifi-
cantly. The second method of determining the value of the survivorship
annuity is by reference to the sale of a comparable contract by a com-
pany engaged in the business of selling contracts of a similar nature. In
other words, how much would an insurance company have charged
SO. N.Y. Tax Law § 249-v.
81. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ S-46 to 3-47 (Supp. 1961) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 11.40
(1959); S.C. Code § 65-474 (1952); Va. Code Ann. § 55-269 (1959); Wis. Stat. § 314.C5
(1958). For a compilation of the methods of valuation used in all the state2, see P-H Inh.,
& Trans. Tax Serv. ff 132, under the name of each state.
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Mrs. Endemann for an annuity providing for the payment of $1,570.20
annually for her life at age seventy-three? This method of valuation is
cited with approval in the Federal Estate Tax Regulations, 82 but while
the citation there concerns a survivorship contract, it does not involve a
contract whereby the value of the annuity is attributable to contribu-
tions made by the decedent's employer, either under a "qualified" plan
or otherwise. California provides that in the case of a commercial annuity
contract, issued by a company regularly engaged in the business of selling
such contracts, the value of the annuity is ordinarily the cost of tile
contract; 83 but, in the case of an annuity created by will or trust instru-
ment (not a commercial annuity), the value is to be determined by
reference to the actuaries' combined experience table of mortality.'
B. Conflicting Problems of Basis on Account of Conflicting Estate
Valuations
Because of the fundamental differences in the application of the states'
inheritance tax laws, as compared with the federal estate tax law, it is a
fairly simple matter to foresee that a beneficiary may receive from an
estate property which will take two separate and distinct "bases"-one
for future federal gains or losses and one for future state gains and
losses. It is incongruous that the states should use one method of valua-
tion and the federal government another, when subjecting the identical
property to inheritance and estate taxation. Yet this is an everyday
occurrence, particularly in the valuation of annuities for death tax pur-
poses. With the exception of those states which have adopted the amount
of the Federal State Death Tax Credit allowable under Section 2011 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as their inheritance or estate tax,
few states have adopted the federal rule for determining the valuation
of an annuity as set out under sections 2039 (b) and 2039 (c) of the Code.
Consequently, the recipient of a survivorship annuity from a decedent
must frequently look forward to the necessity of maintaining two sets of
income and basis (or cost) records for the future. The surviving annui-
tant will, for state income tax purposes, be deemed to take as her basis
(or cost) the value of the annuity on the date of death of the primary
annuitant; that is, the value calculated for the state inheritance tax pur-
poses. Until this basis is recovered, the surviving annuitant need not be
concerned with the state's income tax on the proceeds of the annuity.
The inconsistency of two taxing authorities placing different valua-
tions on the identical property subjects the taxpayer to an unfair com-
82. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8, Example No. 1 (1962).
83. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 18, regs. 13952-54(i) (1959).
84. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 13953.
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pliance burden. It is no excuse to say that this compliance burden is not
all-inclusive, since it affects taxpayers in only half of the fifty states.ra
Taxpayers similarly situated with identical factual situations deserve
similar tax treatment.
It would appear that the solution to this inconsistency would be ac-
complished through the states' adoption of the federal method of valua-
tion of employee annuities in the case of those estates which come within
the purview of the federal estate tax law, and which contain annuities
includible in the decedent's gross estate. This is not to imply that a
state should imitate the federal statute, nor that the state should relin-
quish any of its sovereignty in fiscal matters. Uniformity of taxation
and tax treatment as an equitable and desirable fiscal characteristic may
be achieved without consequential loss of state revenue, by employing
the method of calculation used by the federal taxing authorities in
specific instances and applicable to specific property. The state need not
adopt the federal statute on the complex questions of annuity taxation;
the method of calculating the valuation of the asset to be included in the
decedent's estate is sufficient for state purposes, and uniformity may be
achieved by the adoption, by reference, of the provisions of those sections
of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations which provide
for calculating the valuation includible in the gross estate.
Uniformity of treatment of taxpayers would dictate that the same
method of calculation be applied to all estates subject to the state's
inheritance tax laws, regardless of whether the size of the estate comes
within the purview of the federal estate tax laws. In fact, the mortality
tables used by the states for inheritance and gift tax purposes are so
diverse that, in the interest of uniformity, the state tax administrators
themselves have urged the enactment of state legislation to adopt the
methods, tables, and discount rates employed by the federal government
in determining the value of future estates.80
An unusual case relating to valuation of the death benefit includible
in the decedent's estate is People v. Bejarano.s? There, the decedent was
employed for over thirty years, most of the time in California and for
a shorter period in Texas. While living and working in those states, he
made contributions from his salary to a company-administered pension
85. The duplicity of basis does not exist in those states which assess the fcderal-state
death tax credit as their estate tax; nor does it exist in any of the seventeen states which
do not have an individual income tax. Of course, it does not occur unless the decedents
gross estate is of sufficient size to come within the purview of the Federal Estate Tax Law.
86. Resolution No. 11 of those adopted at the 28th annual meeting of the National
Association of Tax Administrators held at Minneapolis, June 13-15, 1960.
87. 145 Colo. 304, 353 P.2d 866 (1961).
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trust. The employer's contributions were slightly in excess of the de-
cedent's. The pension trust provided that after five years of employment
the employee was to become entitled to all contributions plus earnings.
Upon the employee's death, the entire amount of contributions, together
with earnings, would go to the employee's beneficiary to the extent that
she was entitled to them. Both California and Texas are community
property states. The decedent died a resident of Colorado. The In-
heritance Tax Commissioner of Colorado sought to tax one half of the
proceeds of the pension trust. The decedent's spouse objected on the
grounds that the proceeds in question had been accumulated in com-
munity property states and that her share was a present vested interest
at the time of accumulation. The state argued that the nature of Mrs.
Bejarano's interest in the community property was one which, by its
nature, under the laws of California and Texas, postponed its possession
and enjoyment until the death of the husband.
The court held that for tax purposes the interest in the property had
previously vested in Mrs. Bejarano. Therefore, the funds were not
subject to inheritance tax assessments. The contributions by the de-
cedent were his earnings and had the quality and character of community
property when deposited into the pension trust fund. After deposit, the
fund retained its community character, even when it or the parties
were removed to a common law state. Hence, since Mrs. Bejarano had
vested rights in the earnings of her husband at the outset, those rights
were entitled to subsequent recognition. Further, the court declined
to accept the Inheritance Tax Commissioner's contention that the elec-
tion of the decedent to participate in the retirement fund plan furnished
the essential act of decedent, constituting a gift or grant intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at death.
Since the court was persuaded to the view that Mrs. Bejarano acquired
vested rights at the outset, it did not consider the Inheritance Tax Com-
missioner's argument that the wife's interest in the community property
was less than a full vested right. Thus, the failure of the noncommunity
property jurisdiction to consider statutes and decisions of the community
property jurisdiction in which the property interest, if any, was acquired,
resulted in the allowance of greater property rights than would have been
allowed in the community property jurisdiction itself.
XI. SUMMARY AND COMMENT
The general tenor of the state court decisions is to hold taxable the
death benefits payable under ordinary pension and profit sharing plans.
Death is considered the generating source or operative event which
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brings into effect the applicable inheritance tax statute, providing that a
grant or gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the death of the grantor or donor constitutes a taxable transfer.
The employee is considered vested with a present, fixed right to a future
enjoyment. If the employee does not live to enjoy his retirement benefits,
the economic interest with which he is vested passes at his death to
designated beneficiaries.
If the courts show any tendency to shy away from a holding of tax-
ability in the case of these benefits, it is because of the troublesome
question of vesting. When, if ever, does the employee acquire a vested
interest in the plan? How much vested interest in the employee is neces-
sary in order to bring the transfer within the purview of the taxing
statute? Can there be "varying degrees of vesting"? These are matters
which apparently give the courts much concern. Is an employee, who is
vested with a present fixed right to a future enjoyment, possessed of as
great a property right or economic interest as the employee who is vested
with an immediate right to a present enjoyment? Apparently he is, at
least for purposes of inheritance taxes, and the decisions in DorsoyV
and Daniel" seem dearly to hold that vesting features which result in
the acquisition of valuable property rights make the benefits taxable.
Most plans give the employee a vested interest in varying degrees. If
an employee terminates his service after a certain number of years,
prior to retirement or death, he may be entitled to withdraw some portion
of the fund deposited to his credit. Liberality of the vesting features is
dependent upon the employer's policy, experience with employee turn-
over, and other incentive factors. In the case of most plans, the em-
ployer parts with his interest in the fund and it is held for the benefit
of the employee. The employee's interest has been compared to the
interest of a participant in a spendthrift trust, where there is no right to
alienate the corpus during the period of the trust.
Somehow, the courts do not seem to be concerned with the source of
contribution to the plan. The Daniel case involved a combined pension
and profit sharing plan whose funds were provided entirely by employer
contributions; yet the noncontributory feature did not cause any concern
to the majority of the court. Of course, it is obvious that a profit sharing
plan, by its very nature, calls for contribution by the employer from
annual profits only, and there is no fixed or predetermined amount of
contribution except from annual profits; therefore, no definite amount
can be set aside as the retirement benefit until the determination of
Ss. 366 Pa. 577, 79 A.id 259 (1951).
S9. 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 NX.2d 252 (1953).
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annual profits, if any. Consequently, whether a plan is contributory or
noncontributory does not appear to be a relevant consideration.
In summary then, the rationale of the courts appears to be pitched
upon one or several of the following considerations: first, that the
decedent owned or possessed a sufficient property right;9 0 second, that
there was a definite or substantial economic benefit which passed from
the employer to the deceased employee's beneficiaries as a result of his
participation in the plan;"' third, that the employee's beneficiaries are
third party beneficiaries to the retirement contract between employer
and employee. 2
The argument against inheritance taxation of the death benefits pay-
able under typical plans, as advanced by the decedent's beneficiary or
his personal representative, seems to take one or several of the following
forms: first, that there is a lack of a sufficient property right in the de-
cedent because of his inability to reduce the fund to actual possession or
enjoyment until his retirement from employment;03 second, that there is
a lack of a sufficient property right because the sole source of contribu-
tions is the employer, or that the plan designated the beneficiary, so that
as far as the employee is concerned, the plan is noncontributory and
nondesignatory, and he is not vested with any property interest;"'
third, that the death benefit is comparable to insurance proceeds which
are generally excluded from inheritance taxation by most states."
In the absence of a statute providing for a specific exemption for
employee death benefits payable under retirement plans, the state court
decisions holding such benefits subject to inheritance taxation as a gift
or grant intended to take effect at or after death, appear clearly correct
and justifiable. Whether it is desirable to exclude such benefits from the
state tax base is a matter of legislative policy rather than of judicial
sanction. If taxing statutes are to be construed and applied in a fair
90. In Estate of Stone, 10 Wis. 2d 467, 103 N.W.2d 663 (1960), the court held that the
decedent's interest in the employees' trust, although defeasible upon certain contingencies,
constituted a sufficient interest in property. The contingency was the employer's reservation
of the right to terminate or amend the plan, but in the event of termination, there was no
reversion to the company. Therefore, an interest under a retirement plan is property, not-
withstanding the reservation by the employer of the right to amend or terminate the plan.
Accord, In re Dorsey's Estate, 366 Pa. 577, 79 A.2d 259 (1951).
91. See, e.g., In re Brackett's Estate, 342 Mich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955).
92. See, e.g., Dolak v. Tax Comm'r, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958).
93. See, e.g., In re Estate of Daniel, 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953).
94. See, e.g., In re Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955).
95. This argument against taxability appears fairly well rejected by the courts. It was
advocated strenuously but to no avail in Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 497, 103 A.2d 153
(1954), and In the Matter of Estate of Clark, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 (1960).
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manner to the taxpayer so as to achieve equal and uniform application
among all taxpayers, then the employee who provides a survivorship
annuity for his spouse, as a result of the creation of a pension plan,
should certainly not enjoy any tax advantage over the employee who
undertakes to accomplish the same result without the aid of his employer.
If the end result is a survivorship annuity, then each deceased em-
ployee's benefits should be subjected to inclusion in the same tax base.
This would insure equality of application and provide the state with a
comprehensive tax base.
PART TWO: STATE INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT
BENEFIT PAYIIENTS
From the outset it should be noted that fifteen states do not tax non-
business individual income.9' Among the remaining states the extent of
the imposition of an individual income tax differs considerably, although
practically every state has attempted in varying degrees to align its
income tax system with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. However,
the inherent difference between the sovereign powers of the states and
those of the federal government with respect to their constitutional au-
thority to levy an income tax has precluded complete success in achieving
state-federal income tax uniformity, and consequently, in many instances,
such attempts have been abandoned. Moreover, among the states them-
selves, there is a lack of uniformity in taxing individual income. Nowhere
is this more apparent than in the field of retirement benefit taxation.
The various states have tailored their respective tax systems to meet
particular fiscal and political needs, by broadening the tax base in ac-
cordance with these requirements. The result has been that the states
have included in, or excluded from, gross income certain retirement pay-
ments only after giving due consideration to their constitutional authority
to do so. Thus, it is difficult to state categorically what treatment will
be given to a particular type of retirement income. An attempt will be
96. They are Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, Nev.
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texams, Washington and Wyoming.
While Connecticut has no personal income tax, and consequently no xthholding provisions,
Connecticut employers who have offices in New York or do business in New York are
required to withhold New York tax from wages of New York residents employed in Con-
necticut under a tax agreement executed by New York and Connecticut on June 21, 1961.
See Ruling of the State Tax Comm'n, July 7, 1961, 3 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. N.Y.
ff 93-026. See also Solomon, Nonresident Personal Income Tax: A Comparative Study in
Eight States, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 105 (1960). Indiana imposes a tax on individual gros
income received from sources within the state. New Hampshire and Tennessee impoae a
personal income tax on individuals' gross income from interest and dividends.
1963]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
made, however, to define broadly the tax treatment accorded such pay-
ments, with the caveat that notable differences exist among the states.
I. COMMERCIAL ANNUITIES
The purchase of a commercial annuity is a means whereby an indi-
vidual can provide for continuity of income for himself and his family
after reaching a given age. The amounts received as payments under an
annuity contract consist of two elements. A part of the payment is merely
the return on the investment in the annuity; the remainder is the incre-
ment in value of the amount so invested. Consequently, the amount
which the annuitant receives in excess of his cost basis is taxed as income.
Both the federal government and the states tax the income portion of
the payments in excess of the original investment, but the method of
taxation imposed by each differs. Neither the federal government nor
the states, however, tax the annuity income as it accrues, but defer the
tax until payments are actually received or are made available to the
annuitant or other designated beneficiary.
The states follow three basic patterns in taxing annuity payments.
The first pattern utilized is to exempt all payments from income until
the original cost has been recovered. Accordingly, annuity payments
are income only to the extent of payments received after the aggregate
premiums (income tax cost) have been recovered. Under this system,
the annuitant is given a significant tax benefit insofar as the tax is
deferred until after his cost is recouped. This benefit is offset, however,
when the annuitant lives beyond his normal or annuity life expectancy
because the full amount of such payments, after recovery of his cost,
becomes taxable. The annuitant can, of course, receive some fiscal satis-
faction from the fact that his total taxable income, and consequently his
tax rate, is generally lower in the later years of his life. Moreover, he
has outlived the actuarial date of his expected demise and is reaping
extra interest on his investment.
It should be noted, however, that in those states which use this scheme
for taxing annuity payments, if the annuity contract provides for the
separation of payments into principal and interest, the interest is taxed
when received regardless of whether the cost has been recovered or not.
As a result, the tax deferment benefit does not inure to the taxpayer.
The second tax pattern, commonly referred to as the "three per cent
rule," 98 operates as follows: If an annuity is payable in annual install-
97. E.g., Va. Code Ann. § 58-78(b)(2) (Supp. 1962). See Instructions For Preparing
Form 790, Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Taxation, p. 9; Wis. Admin. Code, Tax
§ 2.57, 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Wis. fJ 10-521.
98. E.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17101; Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 279(1) (1957).
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ments, only that portion of the amount received in any taxable year
equal to three per cent of the aggregate premiums paid by the annuitant,
whether or not paid during the taxable year, is included in gross income.
Conversely, the portion of each installment received in any taxable year
in excess of three per cent of the aggregate premiums, divided by
twelve and multiplied by the number of months for which the installment
is paid, is not included in gross income. When the aggregate of the
amounts received and excluded from gross income equals the aggregate
premiums paid for the annuity, the entire amount received thereafter in
each taxable year is included in gross income. 0 If installment payments
are received on a monthly or other basis, the payments are appropriately
prorated.
Where amounts are paid under a joint and survivor's annuity, the
value of any part of the survivor's interest must be included in the gross
estate for state inheritance or estate tax purposes. The basis or cost of
such interest to the survivor annuitant is considered to be the value of
the life annuity at the time of the decedent's death. Such valuation is
substituted, as of the date of the first annuitant, for the consideration
previously used for purposes of determining the taxable amounts of the
annuity payments received after the death of the deceased annuitant.
With respect to the survivor annuity payments made after the death of
the first annuitant, the amount of the consideration, determined in ac-
cordance with the rule, must be substituted for the consideration that
may be recovered without inclusion in gross income.
The third basic state annuity tax pattern is generally referred to as
the "federal rule." °10 Briefly, this rule provides for the exclusion of a
portion of each payment from gross income. The method of exclusion
is prescribed by the so-called "exclusion ratio" formula, which is equal
to the amount which the investment in the contract bears to the expected
return as of the annuity starting date.'0 ' Ordinarily, once the exclusion
99. For example, if the taxpayer purchases an annuity for $50,C00 which is payable
$5,000 per year, $1,500 or 3% of $50,000 is taxed as gross income and $3,600 is exempt.
As soon as the tax exempt payments equal $50,000, the full amount of the $5,U3 annual
payment becomes taxable.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4 (1956). The "federal rule" has been expressly adopted iy Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 79-3205(b) (2) (Supp. 1961) and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:44 (Supp. 1961).
S.C. Laws 1961, Acts No. 332 adopts the federal rule with respect to estate tax of annuities.
Effective April 1, 1963, New York will impose a new estate tax which specifically incorporates
many of estate tax provisions under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended
through December 31, 1961. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 1013. See also N.Y. Tax Law
§ 612(a) (personal income tax).
101. For example, if as of the annuity starting date, the taxpayer's investment is $7,700
and his expected return is $12,000, his exclusion ratio would be 7,700/12,000 or 64.2%. If
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is computed, it will remain constant even though the annuitant outlives
his life expectancy. Therefore, under the federal rule, it is possible for
the annuitant to recover, tax free, an amount greater than his original
investment in the annuity contract.102 It should also be noted that under
the federal rule, the exclusion ratio does not change regardless of the type
of annuity involved. Consequently, where a joint and survivor annuity
is involved, the exclusion ratio used by the primary annuitant is also
used by the survivor annuitant after the former's death.
The federal regulations set forth rather' specific definitions and ex-
amples of the technical terms "investment in the contract, '10 3 "expected
return,""' "exclusion ratio" and "annuity starting date."' 05 Hence, ref-
erence should be made thereto for a more detailed discussion of these
terms and of the other technical rules and regulations governing the taxa-
tion of commercial annuities.
Thus, it is readily seen that while the state income tax statutes permit
the annuitant to recoup his investment tax free, an effort is made to tax
any increment. The three basic rules set forth above appear to be equi-
table, but only the first seems to give mathematical certainty, and this
at the state's expense of granting a tax deferment benefit.
II. INDUSTRIAL RETIREMENT PLANS
In recent years, there has been a large increase in the number of
qualified pension, profit sharing and retirement plans adopted by indus-
try. Unquestionably, the highly favorable income tax treatment afforded
such plans by the federal government is responsible in a large measure
for this increase. Among the numerous federal income tax benefits result-
ing from the adoption of qualified pension or profit sharing plans are the
following: (1) the plan is permitted to produce and accumulate income
without the imposition of a tax; 1 6 (2) the employer is entitled to a
deduction, within specified limits, for his contribution to the plan
when made; 1 7 (3) the employee is not presently taxed on the amount
of the employer's contribution credited to his account;' and (4) if by
reason of the employee's death or other termination of his employment
his monthly annuity payment were $60, his monthly exclusion would be $38.52 (64.2% X
$60). Therefore, the annuitant would include $21.48 of each payment in his gross Income
for tax purposes.
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-6 (1956).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-6 (1956).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-5 (1956).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(b) (1956).
106. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 501(a)-(b).
107. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404.
108. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402; Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a) (1) (i) (1956).
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the total distribution is made within one taxable year to the recipient,
the amount in excess of the total contribution by the employee is taxed
at capital gains rates rather than at ordinary income rates. 09 Accord-
ingly, there is little wonder that these retirement plans have increased
in number so rapidly over the past few years. Their popularity, how-
ever, has not gone unnoticed by the states, for many have adopted
legislation affording them favorable tax treatment similar to that of the
federal government. The desired benefits have been accomplished
either by enacting legislation similar to Sections 401-04 of the Internal
Revenue Code, or merely by incorporating the relevant Code sections by
reference. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the similarity
to the federal laws, the state statutes vary the tax treatment of such
payments.
Virginia,' Louisiana,"' Maryland"- and Wisconsin"1 do not impose
a tax until payments under the plan exceed the employee's contributions.
However, the appropriate Virginia and Maryland provisions, failing to
distinguish between ordinary income and capital gains do not provide
for capital gains treatment for lump sum payments.
California" and Georgia,'-" on the other hand, while extending the
same favorable tax treatment to such plans, apply the three per cent
rule to payments received or made available to the employee or dis-
tributee. The Georgia regulations"0 provide that if the employee receives
payment in installments, such portion of the installment payment not in
excess of three per cent of the aggregate contributions paid by the em-
ployee, is taxed as income. Consequently, if the employee made no
contributions to the plan, the funds being contributed solely by the
employer, the payments are fully taxable in the year received or accrued.
Kansas, on the other hand, has adopted legislation which follows the
applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury
Regulations." 7 Accordingly, employees are not taxed on amounts con-
109. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 402 (a) (2), 403 (a) (2).
110. Va. Code Ann. § 53-78(b) (2) (Supp. 1962). See Instructions For Preparing Form
790, Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Taxation, p. 9.
111. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:185 (1950).
112. AMd. Ann. Code art. 81, § 280(p) (Supp. 1962).
113. Wis. Admin. Code, Tax § 2.67(1) (d), 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Wis. U 10-503.
114. Cal. Re,. & Tax. Code §§ 17101, 17503-06.
115. Ga. Code Ann. § 92-3107(b) (2) (1961).
116. Ga. Tax regs., §§ 92-3107(b) (2) (b), (e), CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Ga. J 10-405s
10-40S.
117. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 79-3205 (Supp. 1961). However, "the mansas Statute is
not as definite." See CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Kan. § 10-363. In a letter to Commerce
Clearing House dated September 2, 1944, the Kansas State Tax Commneioner stated that
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tributed by their employers to qualified plans until such time as the
amounts are actually distributed or made available to them. Where the
proceeds are distributed to employees or their beneficiaries in periodic
payments, the recipient is taxed at ordinary income rates. If the em-
ployee made contributions, or was taxed for any reason when contribu-
tions were made for him, these periodic distributions are taxed as income
under the annuity contract," 8 with the employee's contributions being
considered the cost of the annuity to be recovered tax free. This treat-
ment applies whether distributions are made under a trust or under
annuity contracts.'" Since Kansas also distinguishes between ordinary
income and capital gains, the recipient is permitted to report as capital
gains the taxable portion of the sum received by reason of the employee's
death or other termination of his employment, if it represents a complete
withdrawal of sums due him and is received within his taxable year.
Insofar as New York has adopted federal adjusted gross income as the
basis of state income tax, 20 the federal treatment of income from stock
bonus, pension and profit sharing plans and annuities also has been
followed.
III. STATE AND MUNICIPAL PENSIONS
State and local governments have adopted a variety of pension and
retirement plans for their employees. The benefit payments received
from such plans have either been taxed or exempted from state income
taxation in an almost equal variety of ways. In each instance, careful
consideration must be given to the legislation adopting the particular
plan as well as to the applicable statutes pertaining to taxation of pay-
ments received therefrom. The taxpayer's attention should first be
directed to the act creating the retirement plan to ascertain whether it
exempts payments received thereunder from taxation. For example,
amounts received under the Georgia State Teachers Retirement Act and
State Employees System are specifically excluded from state income
the Kansas State Income Tax Department follows the federal law in regard to the de-
ductibility of amounts paid by an employer to a stock bonus, pension or profit sharing
plan exclusively for the benefit of employees. Pending legislative action or court decision
interpreting the law to the contrary, the Kansas State Income Tax Department will recog-
nize such pension plans where approved by the federal government. Amounts paid by an
employee to such a fund are not deductible.
118. Generally, the tax cost of the annuity is prorated over the remaining life expect-
ancy of the recipient, measured from the date of the first distribution, or, where payments
have been received prior to 1954, measured from January 1, 1954. See note 101 supra and
accompanying text.
119. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 402, 403.
120. N.Y. Tax Law § 612(a).
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taxation." 1 Accordingly, the Wisconsin Department of Taxation has
stated in a letter that in determining the exemption status of retirement
benefits paid to state employees it is necessary to look to the particular
retirement law under which the benefits are being paid.," If the par-
ticular retirement act fails to exempt the payment from state income
taxation, however, the taxpayer must look elsewhere for authority to
exclude it from gross income. Such exemption may be found in the state
constitution as is the case in the New York Constitution which provides:
All salaries, wages and other compensation, except pensions, paid to officers and
employees of the state and its subdivisions and agencies shall be subject to taxation2 3
Other states such as Virginia- 4 have exempted various types of state
and municipal retirement payments from taxation by passing special
statutes. MIaryland, on the other hand, taxes at ordinary income rates
the retirement pay of state and local employees and teachers, where such
payments are for past services and based on length of service.'2
In order to properly report his or her taxable income, the taxpayer
must be careful to distinguish between the types of retirement pay which
he receives, particularly where such payments are combined. For ex-
ample, a laryland teacher who upon retiring receives annual payments
of $1,500, part of which is for an annuity to which she contributed
$3,000, and part of which is a pension payment, must first determine the
exact amount of each type of payment. Assuming $700 is received from
the annuity and $800 from the pension, the $1,500 will be taxed as
follows: (1) three per cent of the $3,000 invested in the annuity or $90
is taxable as investment income; (2) the $S00 received under the pension
is taxable at ordinary income rates. In this example it will be noted
that the annuity reserve is being reduced each year at the rate of $610
($700 - $90). In less than five years, the annuity reserve will be ex-
hausted and the entire retirement payment of $1,500 will be taxable.
Similarly, combined payments will be partially taxable in those states
which exempt state and municipal retirement payments, but tax annuity
payments under either the three per cent rule, the federal rule, or the
rule employed in Virginia will not be taxed until the entire amount
121. Ga. Tax regs., § 92-3107(b)(6), CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Ga. 10-415.
122. Letter From the Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, July 28, 1948, in 1 CC " State Tax
Cas. Rep. Wis. f 10-709.S0.
123. N.Y. Const. art. XVI, § S. (Emphasis added.)
124. Va. Code Ann. § 51-111.15 (1958) exempts benefits paid under the Virginka Sup-
plemental Retirement System.
125. Opinion of Att'y Gen. of Ald., Release of Income Tax Div., Dc. 2, 1959, revising
Releases of Mlay 1, 1953, July 7, 1955, and May 2, 1955, 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. MBd.
ff 10-505.45.
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contributed by the employee is recovered. It is for the taxpayer to apply
the appropriate rule of his or her state.
IV. MILITARY PENSIONS, RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY PAY
In order to determine the tax status of military pensions and retire-
ment payments for state income tax purposes, it is necessary to under-
stand the difference between these two types of payments and the prin-
ciples underlying each. While both result from the employer-employee
relationship, military pensions are gratuities or honorariums in recogni-
tion of, but not in payment for, past services. On the other hand,
retirement pay is payment for past services and is a kind of deferred
compensation for these services.'-" Therein lies the basic difference.
Generally, pension payments received from the United States, or from
one of the states on account of service in the armed forces, whether such
were rendered by the recipient or by a relative, are not to be included
in the recipient's gross income.12 7 Whenever a government, by appro-
priate legislative action, authorizes the payment of a pension, it is
usually designated as such in the legislative enactment. Accordingly,
reference to such legislation should be made to determine the type of
payment and its consequent tax treatment.
Retirement payments on account of military service are generally
subject to state income taxation. 28 Since military personnel retired
from active duty are still in the service in that they are subject to being
called to active duty in the case of an emergency, such payments are
regarded not only as compensation for services previously rendered, but
also as compensation for awaiting orders in the event an emergency
necessitates their recall to active duty.129 Thus, retirement pay is part
deferred compensation for services previously rendered and part com-
pensation for services presently being rendered. As such, it is subject
to state income taxation, although some states have enacted a "military
pay exclusion" provision which exempts a portion of the payment from
126. Ga. Tax regs., § 92-3107(b) (6), CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Ga. 1 10-415. See also
Kan. Tax regs., art. 92-4-13, CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Kan. ff 10-353.
127. E.g., Ga. Tax regs., 92-3107(b)(6), CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Ga. ff 10-415; Va.
Code Ann. (b)(6) (Supp. 1962). Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 79-3205(b)(4)I(4) (Supp. 1961)
states that in order for the pension to be excluded from gross income it must have been
received as an allowance for a disability resulting from active military service.
128. E.g., Cal. Tax regs., § 17146(c), 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Cal. U 15-765; Ga.
Tax regs., § 92-3107(b)(6), CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Ga. ff 10-415; Nuber v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Taxation, 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Wis. ff 10-708.50 (Cir. Ct., Milwaukee
County, 1955); Fields v. Commissioner of Rev., 314 Ky. 163, 234 S.W.2d 661 (1950).
129. See note 125 supra.
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taxation.1 0 Military retirement pay, however, should be carefully dis-
tinguished from annuities or other similar allowances received for personal
injuries or sickness resulting from active military service. Such pay-
ments are considered gifts or gratuities in much the same way that
pensions are, and as such, are not subject to state income taxation. 13'
Actually, these are not technically gifts or compensation for services
rendered but are in the nature of compensatory damages for personal
injuries or disability sustained while performing services. This exemp-
tion applies also to the beneficiary of a deceased service member.
V. SOCIL SECURITY BENrFrs
Under the various social security acts, employees are entitled to
receive several types of benefit and retirement payments. However, the
two principal kinds of payments are unemployment compensation and
old age survivors insurance. Both are financed by taxes collected under
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act. The employer pays the tax necessary to finance the
unemployment compensation program,132 while both the employer and
employee contribute, in the form of taxes, to the old age survivors in-
surance program.
133
The tax paid by the employer, whether an individual or corporation,
is fully deductible from gross income for federal income tax purposes.1 3
130. E.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17146 states that retirement pay not based on dis-
ability is to be included in gross income, except that it is subject to the military pay
exclusion of $100 per year.
131. E.g., Cal. Tax regs., § 1713S(a) (4), 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Cal. g 15-735; Ga.
Tax regs., § 92-3107(b)(6), CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Ga. f 10-415 (officers); Han. Gem.
Stat. Ann. § 79-3205(b) (4)1(4) (Supp. 1961).
132. The federal unemployment tax rate is 3.15o of the first ',3,CD of wage- paid during
the calendar year to each employee. Since this tax is imposed on employers, it should not
be deducted from the wages of employees. The employer is allowed a credit againt the
federal tax for required contributions of state unemployment funds up to s0% of the
federal tax. Therefore, most employers pay a little more than three-tenths of 15 in federal
unemployment tax.
133. As of January 1, 1963, the social security tax rates are 3 5/3% for employers and
3 5/S% for employees, or a total of 7 1/4%. (The rates for wages paid in 1962 were only
3 1/13 from both employer and employee.) These rates are applicable to the firt $4,,r0o
of wages paid on or after January 1, 1963, whether the wages were earned prior to or
after that date. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 3101(2), 3111(2). Thus, the employer will
withhold $174 from the employee's salary or wages.
134. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162. These contributions are not deductible under
§ 164(b)(3). That section specifically excludes federal excise taxes from the general provi-
sion for deductibility of taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year. Sections 3111 and
3301 specifically provide that such contributions are excise taxes. The deduction of social
security taxes by the employer is, therefore, allowed under § 162 as an ordinary and
necessary business expense.
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However, the employee, in computing his individual federal income tax,
may not deduct the amount which his employer has withheld from his
wages.
These tax collections are held in trust funds, from which the afore-
mentioned benefits are paid. Social security benefit payments have
always been presumed to be exempt from federal income taxation, al-
though no specific statutory exemption has ever been enacted. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, its predecessors and social security
legislation are silent in this regard. It would appear that under the
broad definition of gross income, which includes "all income from what-
ever source derived,"'1 35 both these benefits and that portion of the
employer's contribution which is paid to the employee would be subject
to federal taxation. But this has not been the case.
Even in the absence of any specific exemption these payments have
not been held to be gross income by the Internal Revenue Service. As
early as 1941, an office ruling issued by the Income Tax Unit of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that social security benefits "are
not subject to Federal income tax in the hands of recipients."'' 00 On
November 20, 1957, the Internal Revenue Service, through the adoption
of the final regulations'37 to Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code,
publicly stated its position on this point: "Amounts received as pensions
or annuities under the Social Security Act ...are excluded from gross
income."' 13
The federal government's treatment of these benefits, however, has
not been uniformly followed by the states. For state tax purposes old
age survivors insurance and unemployment compensation payments
have been treated differently. While all the states, with one notable
exception, 139 have followed the federal law in holding old age survivors
insurance payments tax exempt, their basis for making this determination
has varied considerably. For example, Delaware, Minnesota and Vir-
ginia have made such payments exempt by statute.140 Alabama, Utah
and Wisconsin have held the payments tax exempt by informal ruling.
135. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a).
136. I.T. 3447, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 191, 192. Several formal rulings have followed
which support this position. Rev. Rul. 55-652, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 21; Rev. Rul. 56-631,
1956-2 Cum. Bull. 25.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-11(b) (1957).
138. Ibid.
139. In Mississippi, the individual employee is taxed on any amount which he receives
in excess of his contribution, i.e., any amount that has already been deducted by the em-
ployer. Letter From Chief of Income Tax Div., March 27, 1939, in 1 CCH State Tax Cas.
Rep. Miss. f[ 10-617.85.
140. Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1116(14) (1953); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.08(3) (1962);
Va. Code Ann. § 58-78(b) (8) (Supp. 1962).
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New York has adopted federal adjusted gross income, and thereby
exempted such payments. Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa and North Dakota have
simply followed the federal law, and in Massachusetts the court reversed
an informal ruling of the State Tax Commissioner which held such
payments subject to taxation.14'
Commissioner v. Gray' " is the most recent case on this point. There,
the taxpayer reported income from wages only and paid the tax thereon.
The Commissioner imposed an additional tax of twenty-five per cent on
$920 in old age survivors insurance payments contending that such pay-
ments were in fact "retirement allowances" and, hence, taxable under a
Massachusetts statute."' The court, in holding that the payments were
not to be included in gross income, reasoned as follows:
Old age benefits do not readily fit within the general concept of business income in
the nature of wages. They certainly are not in terms withir the most nearly ap-
plicable provision of § 5(b), relating to "retirement allowances... from the common-
wealth or any county, city, town, or district thereof, or from any person." Such
benefits, financed by a nationally administered tax program, vere unlmown in 1920
when this provision was first enacted. They are received from the Federal govern-
ment, not from a former employer. They rest not upon any contract of employment
but upon statutory provisions.' 44
While conceding that in a general sense these payments arise from
the employer-employee relationship, the court nevertheless concluded that
they could not be said to be wholly in the nature of further compensation
for services rendered and taxable accordingly. Thus, the court lined
up Massachusetts with the vast majority of states and the federal gov-
ernment in holding old age survivors insurance payments tax exempt.
Among the states which tax income, only Colorado, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Utah and Wisconsin imposed a tax on unemployment com-
pensation payments. 'Mississippi, alone, taxes both unemployment com-
pensation and old age survivors insurance payments but limits such
taxation to payments received in excess of the employee's contribution.'
VI. RAYLROAD RETIRE1ENT BENEFITS
While there exists a lack of uniformity in taxing most retirement
benefit payments, all the states, albeit reluctantly in some instances, have
141. State Tax Comm'n v. Gray, 340 Mlass. 535, 165 N.E32d 4C4 (1960).
142. Ibid.
143. Mlass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, § 5(b) (195S).
144. 340 Mlass. at 540, 165 N.E.2d at 407-0S.
145. See note 139 supra and accompanying text. Unemployment compemation pay-
ments made to (laid-off) employees should be distinguished from voluntary company
financed supplemental unemployment benefit plans such as guaranteed annual wage plans
which are generally taxable.
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exempted benefits paid under the Railroad Retirement Acts.140 This
unanimity has resulted neither by chance nor by choice, but was dictated
by Congress. The acts specifically provide that payments shall not be
"subject to any tax.' 147 Although the states have yielded to this con-
gressional mandate, they have reached the decision to exempt these
payments from income taxation by pursuing various avenues of approach.
New York has adopted federal adjusted gross income as the basis of
state taxation and since payments under the Railroad Retirement Acts
are specifically exempted from any tax, they are subject to no New York
state income tax.
"Amounts paid by carriers as pensions to retired employees in addi-
tion to annuities or pensions paid by the Railroad Board, however, are
included in gross income." 48 Maryland has similarly ruled on payments
under the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act and further held that contributions to the Railroad Retire-
ment Fund are not deductible.'49
The history of exemption in Wisconsin is interesting. A state statute
exempted pensions received from the United States Government. 11° The
Wisconsin Department of Taxation, however, attempted to tax railroad
retirement payments on the ground that they were received not from
the United States, but from the railroad, with the federal government
merely acting as the middle man through whom the pension was paid.
In Doner v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation,'"' the pension in question was
held not to be subject to the Wisconsin income tax. Payments from the
Railroad Retirement Board were adjudged to constitute a pension within
the meaning of the Wisconsin statute, in that they were derived from
the general funds of the United States Treasury rather than from a
separate fund consisting of taxes paid by employer and employee. It
was not until fifteen years later that the Wisconsin Department of Taxa-
tion by letter'512 formally recognized this decision by exempting Railroad
Retirement payments from state income taxation.
146. Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 228a
(1958); Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 Stat. 1094 (1938), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§ 351-67 (1958).
147. 50 Stat. 316 (1937), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 228a (1958); 52 Stat. 1097 (1938),
as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1958).
148. N.Y. Tax regs., art. 40, 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. N.Y. " 15-367.20 (Ruling of Tax
Comm'n, April 2, 1938).
149. Opinion of the Att'y Gen. of Md. to the State Comptroller, 1 CCH State Tax Cas.
Rep. Md. fI 10-505.51, 24 Ops. Att'y Gen. 805 (1939).
150. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.03 (2) (a) (1957).
151. 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Wis. ff 10-708.60 (Cir. Ct., Langlade County, 1942).
152. Letter From Tax Counsel, Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, March 1, 1957, in 1 CCH
State Tax Cas. Rep. Wis. fI 10-708.70.
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Other states which have failed to enact specific legislation, issue
rulings, or litigate the matter, have simply stated that such payments
are exempt in the instructions given taxpayers for filing state income tax
returns.153
VII. Crv SERvicE ANxNuITIs
Payments received under the Federal Civil Service Retirement Act
are generally subject to state income taxation,'1 although the methods
of taxing such payments vary among the states in the same manner in
which taxation of commercial and industrial annuities differ. By way
of illustration, in Virginia the recipient is entitled to receive the total
amount of his contribution paid into the system tax free, before he is
regarded as having received taxable income. 15 Once the benefits received
equal his total contribution, additional payments are regarded as gross
income for state tax purposes.
On the other hand, MNaryland, while treating all payments received
pursuant to the Federal Civil Service Retirement Act as pension and
annuity income, applies the "three per cent" rule.""0 Under this rule as
noted previously, if payments are received in annual installments, only
the amounts received in any taxable year which equal three per cent of
the aggregate premiums paid by the annuitant, even if paid during that
taxable year, are considered gross income. As soon as the total amounts
received and excluded from gross income equal the aggregate premiums
paid, any payments received thereafter are taxable as gross income . 5 7
Those states, e.g., Kansas, s which follow the "federal rule," tax civil
service retirement payments but exclude a certain portion of each pay-
ment from gross income. The portion excluded is determined by means
of a formula termed the "exclusion ratio" which equals the ratio which
the investment in the contract bears to the expected return under the
contract as of the annuity starting date. Generally, the portion of the
payment excluded will be the amount contributed by the employee to the
civil service program, divided by his life expectancy at the time payments
153. Instructions For Preparing Form 760, Commonwealth of Xirgnia Dep't of Taxa-
tion, p. 5; Kansas Income Tax Instructions For Form 40, p. 2. However, it should he noted
that the exemption of railroad retirement benefits from inheritance taxation in Virginia is
specifically provided for by statute. Va. Code Ann. § 53-153 (Supp. 1962).
154. Instructions For Filing Form 540, State of California, p. 4; Instructions For Pre-
paring Form 760, Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Taxation, p. 6. See aIho note 125
supra.
155. Va. Code Ann. § 5S-7S(b) (2) (Supp. 1962).
156. See note 125 supra.
157. See note 99 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this rule.
158. Kansas Income Tax Instructions For Form 40, p. 2.
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began. This exclusion ratio will remain constant regardless of how long
the annuitant lives and even though monthly payments increase in
amount. 159
'hus federal employees who receive payments pursuant to the Civil
Service Retirement Act, generally must include such payments in gross
income for state tax purposes, while payments under the Social Security
Act and Railroad Retirement Act are received tax free with few excep-
tions. It would appear, therefore, that the federal employee is burdened
by a form of tax discrimination. Not only does this seem to be
unjustified, but completely contrary to the federal government's avowed
policy of attracting capable people by affording fringe benefits in the
form of tax sheltered payments.
The question of whether Congress has the power to exempt such pay-
ments from state taxation, has been raised, but remains unanswered.
Concurring in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 00 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter stated:
Whether Congress may, by express legislation, relieve its functionaries from their
civic obligations to pay for the benefits of the State governments under which they
live is a matter for another day.161
That day has not yet arrived, and until it does the taxpayer receiving
civil service retirement payments must report them as taxable income
on his state tax return.
VIII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGE AwARDs
While workmen's compensation payments generally provide the tem-
porarily disabled or injured employee with a source of continuing income
during the period of incapacity, these payments are often equivalent to
retirement income in cases where the employee is completely disabled
or forced to retire. The states have uniformly exempted such payments
from gross income. Typical of the statutes enacted is that of California0"'
which provides as follows: "[G]ross income does not include-(1)
Amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation
for personal injuries or sickness. . . ." The regulations applicable to this
section of the California statute further provide that such payments are
159. Rev. Rul. 57-508, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 67.
160. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
161. Id. at 492 (concurring opinion).
162. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17138(a)(1). For similar provisions see Ga. Code Ann.
§ 92-3107(b) (3) (1961); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:46 (1950); Va. Code Ann. § 58-78(b) (4)
(Supp. 1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.03(2) (1957) and Wis. Admin. Code, Tax § 3.61, 1
CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Wis. ff 10-709(1).
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excluded from gross income if made pursuant to a "statute in the nature
of a workmen's compensation act,' 0 3 and for personal injuries or sick-
ness incurred in the course of employment. Furthermore, such payments
are nontaxable when paid "to the survivor or survivors of the deceased
employee."
*
'
4
The states, for the most part, have appended to the workmen's com-
pensation tax exclusion legislation additional provisions for the exclu-
sion of damage awards for personal injuries. For example, the California
statute expressly provides that gross income does not include "the amount
of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of
personal injuries or sickness .... ,"I" The California Tax Regulations
define "damages received" as an amount received (other than worhmen's
compensation) through the prosecution of an action sounding in tort or
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.CO
As in the case of workmen's compensation payments, damages recov-
ered for injuries are not considered retirement benefits per se. But they
may amount to such in the situation where the injuries force the indi-
vidual into retirement.
IX. INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Life insurance proceeds paid in a lump sum by reason of the death of
the insured are not generally looked upon as a source for funding the
retirement years of the beneficiary. However, they often serve this
purpose, particularly in the case of the surviving spouse. In sheltering
such payments from taxation, the states have frequently followed the
rules set forth by the federal government in Section 101 of the Internal
Revenue Code. In brief, the proceeds of life insurance paid, by reason
of the death of the insured, to his estate or beneficiary, directly or in
trust, are excluded from the gross income of the recipient.20 7
Speaking conventionally, in terms of retirement income, life insurance
proceeds may be called upon to fund retirement years where the insured,
or in the case of his death, the beneficiary, elects under the terms of the
policy to have the insurer retain the total sum due and merely distribute
the interest thereon periodically or allocate installments of principal and
interest to the insured or the beneficiary. The interest paid on the funds
does not enjoy the same tax exempt status as do the proceeds paid by
163. Cal. Tax regs., § 17138(a)(1), 1 CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Cal. E 15-735(b).
164. Ibid.
165. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 1713S(a) (2).
166. Cal. Tax regs., § 1713S, 1 CCII State Tax Cas. Rep. Cal. 15-735(c).
167. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 17131-33.
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reason 'of the insured's death, but is generally reportable as gross
income.168
Amounts received under a life insurance or endowment policy (other than amounts
paid by reason of the death of the insured, interest payments on such amounts, and
amounts received as annuities) are not taxable .... [Until their aggregate] . . exceeds
the aggregate premiums or consideration paid whether or not paid during the taxable
year.' 69
Accordingly, the investment can be recouped tax free-only the incre-
ment is taxable. Similarly excluded from gross income is the "amount
received by the insured as a return of the premiums paid by him under
life insurance or endowment contracts, either during the term or at
maturity' x70 or at the surrender of the contract.
X. CONCLUSION
As the types of retirement plans, as well as the number of persons
participating in them, continue to increase, the question of state tax
liability for payments received therefrom becomes increasingly more
important. Unfortunately, this area of the law is far from clear not
only because all forms of retirement payments are not covered by the
state tax codes, but also because many states have been forced to handle
the problems involved on an informal case by case basis, without the aid
of complete or comprehensive regulations, rulings or case law. In many
instances, definitive rules of law are completely lacking as to certain
types of payments. Moreover, even where applicable statutes, ad-
ministrative regulations or informal interpretations are available, the
states have embarked on divergent methods of tax imposition. General
trends and methods are nevertheless perceptible. Accordingly, the often
repeated caveat is most applicable to state taxation of retirement benefit
payments: Care must be taken to insure the proper reporting of such
payments.
168. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 17131-32; Ga. Code Ann. § 92-3107(b)(2) (1961);
Va. Code Ann. § 58-78(b) (Supp. 1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.03(2)(c) (1959).
169. Kan. Tax regs., art. 92-425, CCH State Tax Cas. Rep. Kan. § 10-403.
170. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §'79-3205(b)(2) (Supp. 1961). See also Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code § 17108; Ga. Code Ann. § 92-3107(b)(2) (1961).
